EQUILIBRIUM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

TM ANDERSEN; H VETTER

EQUILIBRIUM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

TM ANDERSEN
, H VETTER

Aarhus Universitet

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

6 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In a model with continuous entry and exit to the labor market, it is shown that workers exploit their monopoly power by adopting a seniority system implying youth unemployment or an age determined insider-outsider distinction. The incentives of young outsiders to unberbid are curtailed by their expectation of becoming insiders in the future

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Journal of Economics
Vol/bind	61
Udgave nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	1-10
Antal sider	10
ISSN	0931-8658
Status	Udgivet - 1995
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

Adgang til dokumentet

Equilibrium youth unemploymentForlagets udgivne version, 448 KBLicens: Ikke-specificeret

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01231481Licens: Ikke-specificeret

Citationsformater

@article{0be42c7d2e8544e9935535f43e1d68cc,

title = "EQUILIBRIUM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT",

abstract = "In a model with continuous entry and exit to the labor market, it is shown that workers exploit their monopoly power by adopting a seniority system implying youth unemployment or an age determined insider-outsider distinction. The incentives of young outsiders to unberbid are curtailed by their expectation of becoming insiders in the future",

author = "TM ANDERSEN and H VETTER",

year = "1995",

language = "English",

volume = "61",

pages = "1--10",

journal = "Journal of Economics",

issn = "0931-8658",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - EQUILIBRIUM YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

AU - ANDERSEN, TM

AU - VETTER, H

PY - 1995

Y1 - 1995

N2 - In a model with continuous entry and exit to the labor market, it is shown that workers exploit their monopoly power by adopting a seniority system implying youth unemployment or an age determined insider-outsider distinction. The incentives of young outsiders to unberbid are curtailed by their expectation of becoming insiders in the future

AB - In a model with continuous entry and exit to the labor market, it is shown that workers exploit their monopoly power by adopting a seniority system implying youth unemployment or an age determined insider-outsider distinction. The incentives of young outsiders to unberbid are curtailed by their expectation of becoming insiders in the future

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0931-8658

VL - 61

SP - 1

EP - 10

JO - Journal of Economics

JF - Journal of Economics

IS - 1

ER -