Abstract
In oligopoly, comparison of the tax pass-through favors the use of ad valorem taxes compared to unit taxes. We argue that, in addition to differences in tax pass-through, the two taxes have a dissimilar effect on firms' strategic interaction. The anticompetitive effects of the two taxes favor unit taxes over ad valorem taxes. We show both when there is a preference for unit taxation and when it is likely that the conventional preference for ad valorem taxation is upheld.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Public Finance Review |
| Vol/bind | 42 |
| Udgave nummer | 4 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 532-551 |
| Antal sider | 19 |
| ISSN | 1091-1421 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2014 |
| Udgivet eksternt | Ja |